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What do leaders like Xi Jinping, Boris Johnson and Saudi Prince Mohammed Bin Salman have in common? More than you can imagine, writes Gideon Rahman, a well-known columnist for The Financial Times, who once worked for The Economist.
He sees the three men as evidence of the arrival of the “Age of Authoritarian Leaders,” as his latest book is titled. These kinds of leaders pose a threat not only to the well-being of their countries, but also to a world order in which liberal and cosmopolitan ideas are increasingly being fought.
It is hard to argue that the three of them, along with leaders like Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, newly elected Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, and Brazilian President Zhair Bolsonaro, share some commonalities.
To varying degrees, they claim to speak for the common man, while undermining democratic institutions, nurturing nationalism, and cultivating a personal style of doing politics, and in some cases even a direct cult of personality.
It is true that Boris Johnson has not been accused of ordering the assassination of any critic, as Bin Salman did, in the case of Saudi journalist Jamal Kashoxhi. But Rahmanarg argues convincingly that the style of the strong leader is a continuum, in which the proximity of his exponents is reinforced or weakened by the particular political system in which everyone functions.
It is surprising to see how many contemporary leaders fit into the “identity” of an authoritarian leader. With Donald Trump and Narendra Modin, India’s prime minister, the three most populous countries in the world were run until last year by authoritarian leaders.
They are present in Europe (Johnson, Orban and Vladimir Putin), in Africa (Ethiopian Prime Minister Abij Ahmed) and in Asia (Modi, Xi, and Rodrigo Duterte, President of the Philippines). The Middle East has Erdogan, Bin Salman and Benjamin Netanyahu, the former prime minister of Israel.
The two Americas contribute with Bolsonaro and Mexican President Andres Obrador.
The list includes members of the royal family, elected politicians and autocrats. They cause a lot of damage. The damage is not only to the people they oppress or the national political systems that are eroding from within.
Authoritarian leaders are disregarding global institutions, international norms, and multilateral cooperation. Most of them view free trade with suspicion. Few of them tend to endure too many worries to curb climate change. They are prone to adventurism and aggression in foreign policy, as evidenced by the Russian occupation of Ukraine.
But the ongoing struggle there, which began after the book was written, also suggests the limits of Rahman’s analysis. Under his watch, strong leaders show little solidarity or diplomatic loyalty to one another. Some have sided with Putin.
Others have opposed it, while others are still playing the role of spectator. Identifying someone as a strong leader is only a partial guide to how he or she is likely to behave.
Rahman’s strongest argument is not about authoritarian leaders themselves, but about the desired opinions of Western politicians and analysts about them (including, occasionally, The Economist himself). When Putin succeeded Boris Yeltsin, he was hailed as a man who could stabilize Russian democracy.
Erdogan was also greeted with optimism, as someone who could reconcile Islam and democracy. Abijah hoped to end ethnic divisions in Ethiopia; for Bin Salman to lead the Saudi monarchy moderately in the 21st century, and so on. The real democracies of the world may not be to blame for the rise to power of authoritarian leaders. But they have not been too shrewd to avoid this. / “The Economist” – Bota.al
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